Nosology is the science of defining and classifying diseases. Meta-nosology is the study of how we do this, on what principles nosological practices are based, the quality of the resulting medical taxonomy, and primarily whether/how diseases can be defined better than they are now. In modern Western medicine, there are a wide variety of ways in which diseases are defined and categorized. Examples include by the symptoms they present with (syndromic), their underlying causes (etiological), the biological mechanisms involved (pathogenetic), available treatments, historical precedent, and through diagnostic exclusion. Here, I explore the hypothesis that how we define diseases has an impact on how (and how effectively) we research and treat them. I explore the philosophical implications of this thesis and suggest a direction that the underlying metaphysics of disease definition might follow. I conclude that further research is warranted into whether our current disease definitions could be improved upon.
| INTRODUCTION
Nosology is the science of defining and classifying diseases. Metanosology, then, is the study of how we do this, on what principles nosological practices are based, the quality of the resulting medical taxonomy, and primarily whether/how diseases can be defined better than they are now. In modern Western medicine, there are a wide variety of ways in which diseases are defined and categorized.
Examples include by the symptoms they present with (syndromic), their underlying causes (etiological), the biological mechanisms involved (pathogenetic), available treatments, historical precedent, and through diagnostic exclusion. In a recent paper, Brochhausen demonstrated that the context specific aims and usages of disease definitions present challenges for providing classifications that are both consistent and useful. 1 Here, I explore the philosophical implications of this variety. I conclude that further research is warranted into the philosophical underpinnings of divergent disease definition, with the specific aim of investigating the impact that how we define diseases has on how (and how effectively) we research and treat them.
The topic at hand is worth differentiating from a closely related but distinct question in the philosophy of medicine. I am not concerned here with how we define disease as a concept or state distinct from health, but rather with how we define individual diseases and distinguish them from each other. How we define disease as a concept is discussed extensively in the literature. [2] [3] [4] [5] Furthermore, for the purposes of this paper, I use "disease" in a very loose sense, such that it can refer to any manner of ailment or condition that we might experience, be it a bacterial infection, physical injury, genetic condition, or any other acute or chronic state that the mainstream Western medical profession would consider as being within its remit.
Rigorously establishing a framework of medical definitions for terms such as "disease", "ailment", "syndrome", "injury", and even "health"* is an important project, but beyond the scope of this paper. Such a *There are a variety of candidate meanings for "health" even considered separately from the debate over how to define the notion of disease as general state as opposed to health. For example, one might think of someone's health as a state relative to a time that describes the state of their bodily functions, more like a general evaluation than an absence of disease.
set of definitions should be fit for philosophical purpose, but should respect, as far as is possible, the current nomenclature of medical practice.
In Section 2, I indicate the variety with which disease classification is conducted and expand upon some of the reasons behind such variety. In Section 3, I explore the theoretical implications of current disease practices, and the underlying philosophical themes. In Section 4, I present and defend against a criticism of this proposal. We might want to say that only half of the people have A-itis and that the other half (those with the rash) have a third disease, AB-itis, which is defined as being infected with both virus A and virus B. We may even wish to say that there is only one disease, characterized by being infected by either A or B (AvB-itis). If the treatment and prognosis from infection by each virus is the same (even if the symptoms differ), there may simply be no utility in defining these diseases to such a fine-grained level based on which virus they are infected with.
To further complicate manners, the above definitions rely on the tacit assumption that it is the viruses that are causing the symptoms-a fact that we may have no epistemic access to.
We may not even want to categorize based on underlying aetiology. Medicine is not a solely explanatory endeavour, but one engaged with promoting the health of individuals. Imagine that each member of the group has some combination of runny nose, coughing, rash, fever, vomiting, and blood in stool. A doctor may only be interested in differentiating those who have bloody stool so that they can be treated, knowing that the rest of the symptoms will subside on their own. In which case, they may wish to define by exclusion. by what the underlying biological mechanism is (or might be, depending on whether we even have reliable epistemic access to such facts);
or by the brute realities of what prognosis and treatment require? In real-world medical practice, how we define diseases is inextricably linked with the practical and epistemic factors constraining diagnosis and research, as well as those biological explanations that often dominate the way we think about anything medical. In this sense, nosology is at its heart a practical endeavour. There is no obvious "one size fits all" rule that can be applied universally. There is good reason for this variety. † It is worth noting that however we define diseases, it is important that we do so in a way that is universally consistent. This is the goal of the WHO International Classification of Diseases.
| MEDICAL NATURALISM AND MEDICAL PRAGMATISM
The great variety in disease definition practices illuminates an important philosophical question at the heart of how we define and classify Whilst the primary aim of this research is to find potential benefit for real-world medical practice and research, it is intuitive to believe that there is more to a good theory than mere practical benefit, that it must in some sense accurately describe the way the world is. After all, the Ptolemaic geocentric model of the solar system gave relatively accurate astronomical predictions, but was (rightfully, we believe) It treats those distinctions as works of human artifice. When we define diseases, all we should care about is how the definition facilitates our ability to treat patients and promote health. On this theory, the progress of medical research represents the fine tuning of a theoretical model of human health, based on empirical observations that we group together in a systematic way that is relative to our interests and priorities. ¶ As such, there is a sense in which such progress cannot be properly understood outside of the corresponding conceptual schema and model of medical ontology. For example, the empirical observations about the effects of a medicine in a group of individuals cannot be truly understood as supporting a claim like "medicine M cures disease D" independently of a set of criteria that group the patients in such a way that we consider them all to have one disease
(and in such a way that is relevant to the effects of the medicine on those individuals). There is no theoretical commitment to there being such a thing as the disease, beyond the theoretical entity that we have devised. This is much the same as saying that certain patterns of exchanges and attitudes among individuals cannot truly be understood to support the claim that the British Pound is weakening against the Euro outside of the conceptual scheme that forms our economic systems.
The distinction can be elucidated with the metaphor of joint carving. According to medical naturalism, the job of nosology is much like to that of the butcher. When a butcher carves a carcass, they do so at pre-existing joints that are readily identifiable. How the butcher carves the carcass has no effect on where the joints are. On the contrary, the locations of the joints affect where the butcher carves. The medical pragmatist on the other hand sees the job of nosology as more like that of the cheesemonger. Where a cheesemonger cuts a wheel of cheese is cut is not determined by any special feature of the cheese -it has no joints like the carcass-but that is not to say that the cuts are arbitrary, nor that they are not real. Instead, how and where they cut is determined by their own interest-relative priorities and a variety of practical factors, like the tools and skills of the cheesemonger, or the desired portion size. According to medical pragmatism, the medical distinctions we care about, such as those between diseases, have their source in certain conventional processes, such as the way we think or talk about the world. They are distinctions we create, not discover.
They are artificial, not natural.
There are related questions about disease classification ontology that are strictly orthogonal to the current discussion. Duprés promiscuous realism takes the variety of classificatory practices in science as motivation to reject monism about natural kinds in favour of pluralism, whereby there are numerous objective and equally good ways of forming a scientific taxonomy. 15 As applied to medicine, this addresses a question subsequent to the one at hand, namely whether there is one unified and hierarchical classificatory schema. A medical promiscuous realism assumes medical naturalism, but a pragmatist counterpart could just as easily be developed.
Interpreting disease definition as "the workmanship of the understanding" 16 ) and the philosophy of medicine (as discussed by Reznek, 5 Simon 13 ) may be surprised to see this weaker position-pragmatism-in place of full-blooded antirealism about disease. The main reason for favouring pragmatism over antirealism relates to the primary goals of this project-to facilitate better medical practice and research. There is no practical benefit for medicine in moving from the epistemic position of pragmatism to the metaphysical position of antirealism. Pragmatism is however completely compatible with antirealism, so those who find independent philosophical merit in that position are free to adopt it along with the results of this project. ¶ Much in the same way that conventional systems work according to Lewis. 14 precedent for approaching medical definitions in this way. In medical research, study case definitions are, by necessity, often based on artificial definitions of the condition being studied. These definitions can differ significantly from those used in clinical practice. This deviation is borne out of necessity, as the requirements for studying a disease often differ from those for maintaining public health.
In a UK-based observational study of the perinatal effects of zika virus in pregnant women, the following case definition is given: Rather, it is made up of time-relative travel history combined with specific relevant adverse events, and even abortion. This is because zika is notoriously difficult to test for, with only a limited window of time in which laboratory tests can accurately detect it.
18-20 CDC guidelines recommend testing for zika within two weeks of exposure, but this is often before symptoms even present. 21 As such, if the study's case definition for instances of zika was "women infected with the zika virus", then this would have impeded the research because of the inherent epistemic hurdles built into zika detection. Given that it is unrealistic to expect cases of zika to be reliably detected by laboratory tests, defining cases based on them does not facilitate good research.
Using the artificial definition given above, an interesting study population is identified that does facilitate good research.
One might think that this is not defining zika differently, but rather simply throwing a wide net to increase the chances of catching zika by also catching cases that are not instances of zika virus, which can then be excluded later. This is a perfectly legitimate interpretation, and is perhaps even how the researchers involved would view it, but the specific intentions of the researchers in this example are not the point of interest. Rather, what is interesting is that it sets a precedent for artificially defining disease in a way that is more obviously in line with the principles of pragmatism. The study definition for zika does not (implicitly or explicitly) make any naturalist claims about the underlying medical ontology, but uses a set of practical criteria that facilitates research.
If one were to evaluate the full potential of pragmatism, then when considering how best to define diseases-be that on an individual, or on a universal scale-one should decide based on how well those definitions facilitate high-quality health care practice and research. It is important to note that this project differs from related projects in metaphysics that give antirealist or conventionalist theories of ontology or essence. # Such projects look at the classifications and distinctions that we actually make, and then seek to give the best explanation of those practices in terms that do not require a realist interpretation. This project is not looking to explain an assumed set of practices through finding the best theory, but assumes the theory to evaluate and modify practice (and at the same time evaluating the theory based on its practical benefits). Thus, this research transitions from theoretical to applied metaphysics in an important sense.
| A CRITICISM
Thus far, I have focused on explicating and motivating the project of meta-nosological investigation and potential modification of disease classification practices, based on a pragmatic metaphysics of disease.
Here, I consider and rebut a criticism of the project, arguing against its worth.
Upon reading the previous sections of this paper, one could be forgiven for thinking that all the project really amounts to is an investigation into how we diagnose disease and how it could be done bet- If definition and diagnosis collapse into one another, then the claim of the project is merely that we need to look at how we diagnose disease, and that is nothing that medics do not already do. What is different about this proposal is that it represents a widespread and systematic overview of the way that we think about disease taxonomy as a whole. Rather than piecemeal ad hoc adjustments to diagnostic criteria, ignorant of the effect on the underlying theoretical framework, a meta-nosological survey of current practices, and investigation into whether there is a systematically unified approach that is feasible # See, for example, Banks and Sidelle. 9, 11 relative to the constraints of the project, would represent an undertaking significantly different from mere reviewing of diagnostic criteria.
The danger from the diagnosis problem came from conflating the definition of a disease, which informs its diagnostic criteria, with the evaluation of those diagnostic criteria themselves. However, even without adopting medical naturalism, there are examples where diagnoses and definitions do (or at least can) come apart. The common cold is a viral infection, but there is no one virus that is considered to be "the cold". We could plausibly define the common cold disjunctively as being infected with 1 or more of a list of viruses. This need not even be a determinate list, nor do we need to know exactly which viruses are on it and which are not. This is because there is no laboratory testing for the common cold. Diagnosis occurs based on symptoms, most commonly by the patient themselves without ever having seen a physician. If a patient does see a physician, diagnosis would still be based on symptoms.
As there is no one virus that is the common cold, it cannot be tested for in this fashion, but it is also the case that because of the favourable prognosis for patients with a cold, there is no need to use the resources to do so. In fact, if diagnosis and definition had to match up exactly, then the definition would be a poor one, as it would require too many tests performed on patients, and too many resources dedicated to a minor ailment. It is clear then that at least in some cases, diagnosis and definition do indeed come apart. This gives the medical pragmatist grounds to reject the unity thesis. As such, it cannot be the case that this project merely restates the already accepted aim in medical science that diagnoses should be reviewed and improved upon. Rather, this endeavour goes deeper, to the core of what diseases are. Reviewing the disease classificatory practices of mainstream medicine, and how they affect practice and research, will certainly allow us to better understand our current medical taxonomy, and may also reveal how those classificatory practices can be improved upon.
| CONCLUSION
The goals of this paper were modest. This paper draws attention to the wide variety of classificatory practices currently in use in modern mainstream medicine, and how our current medical taxonomy is far from systematic. It presented the underlying philosophical tensions, and suggested that there is sufficient precedent to warrant an investigation into the potential for reclassification based on a pragmatic theory of medical ontology. Finally, it defended it from the most obvious potential criticism.
Investigating, and if needs be recommending that we change, the way that we define disease is the primary goal of meta-nosology. The potential for practical impact on medical practice and research is promising, but uncertain. Brochhausen takes preliminary steps in evaluating how existing proposals for classificatory schema interact with both philosophical and practical considerations, and some of the difficulties that presents, but stops short of making concrete proposals on how we might proceed in addressing those difficulties. 1 Only through a combination of empirical work and philosophical investigation can a sufficiently sophisticated theoretical grounding be developed and then tested. Doing so for medical pragmatism is the next important step in this research.
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